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Abstract 
Politics - administration interface is the relationship between politicians and public servants which lies in the 
heart of public administration. Ethiopia has officially been branding herself as developmental state since the 
early 2000s. In the context of developmental state, organic and symbolic relationship between the politics and 
Public service is vital in achieving developmental goals.The aim of this research is examining the nature of 
interface between leaders in political office and the bureaucracy in the Ethiopian civil service. To this end, the 
research question is: “What is the nature of interface between leaders in political office and the bureaucracy in 
the Ethiopian civil service?”The research approach is basically qualitative case study. The actual data collection 
has covered three ministries. The instruments that have been used for collecting data are in-depth interview with 
key informants; focus group discussions; and document analysis.Given the findings of this research, one of the 
key challenges that are hindering the Ethiopian federal civil service from being developmental is the lack of 
development of a professional and politically neutral civil service. Hence, the Ethiopian bureaucracy lacks some 
attributes of bureaucracies in developmental states.  
Keywords: Ethiopian public service, politicization, bureaucracy 
 
I. Background 
The working of government rests on two pillars – political and permanent executive. A good relationship 
between politics and the administration is essential for successful government. Whereas political executive is 
temporary and usually representing the party in power, bureaucracy is permanent. ‘Bureaucrat’ in this paper 
refers to non - elective permanent government officials involved in government administration and is used 
interchangeably with ‘administrator’ and ‘civil servant’.  
Politics - administration interface is the relationship between politicians and public servants which lies in 
the heart of public administration. It can serve as guideline, value and norm in which roles and responsibilities of 
those in public offices have to employ and adhere to. The politics-bureaucracy interface is defined as "the 
particular forms in which politicians and bureaucrats engage with one another and the factors that shape this 
engagement"(Dasaandi 2014). Theoretically, they play different roles. For instance, politicians make policies and 
administrators aid and advise the government to make plans and implement them. But, in practice their roles 
often conflict and overlap because the line separating development of policy and its implementation is quite 
blurred.  
A study on the relationship between politicians and civil servants is one of the core themes in public 
administration. The necessity to understand the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in public 
administration derives from the fact that in many cases it is:  
(1) central to the success or failure to implement institutional (administrative) reforms; (2) fundamental 
for strengthening institutions and achieving successful development outcomes; (3) necessary for public 
sector efficiency and for improving the functioning of the modern democratic state; (4) the key feature 
of the successful developmental state, [which Ethiopia is claiming]; and (5) it builds citizens’ trust in 
government (in both politicians and bureaucrats, with a clear distinction between them), and their 
perceptions about the performance of the entire governmental machinery (Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrah 
2014: 66). 
Organic and symbolic relationship between the politics and Public service is vital in achieving 
developmental goals. The Public Service must feel and champion society's aspirations, must serve people's 
interests, if not in the short term, in the long term. Hence, as a developmental state it is important to 
communicate the visions and missions of the state and the public service to the citizens. This helps to enhance 
genuine trust between leaders and citizens.  
Thus, a successful politics - administrative interface within the public service is at the heart of good public-
sector governance and effectiveness, which in turn, is critical for improved public service delivery and for the 
achievement of national development goals. For this reason, better understanding of how politicians and 
bureaucrats engage with one another and identification of the structural constraints and opportunities that affect 
this engagement is a vital task.  
Separation between political and administrative positions is a generally recognized principle of the 
professional civil services, as well as a foundation for building viable administration system capable to function 
efficiently. However, countries can be placed into three broad categories, based on the type of relationships 
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between politicians and bureaucrats. 
1. Developmental states- where there exists close relationship between political leaders and high-level 
bureaucrats, with the latter given a great deal of autonomy in designing policies. 
2. Predatory states- which are again marked by a close working relationship between politicians and 
bureaucrats. However, in this context bureaucrats are largely controlled by political leaders, and therefore 
have little autonomy or influence. 
3. States - where there is at least formally – a much greater degree of distance between politicians and 
bureaucrats. Though the level of bureaucratic autonomy varies from one state to another state, in general 
bureaucrats tend to be more autonomous than in predatory states, but far less so than in developmental 
states. 
The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats receives significant attention in the literature on 
developmental states. Generally speaking, the literature identifies seven key characteristics of the politics-
bureaucracy interface which leads to successful bureaucracy in developmental states: 
(1) A core group of ‘developmental’ senior politicians and bureaucrats who work closely together; 2) 
Shared developmental values and vision; 3) Shared social class or educational background; 4) Senior 
bureaucrats who were allowed to have significant influence in policy design; 5) Bureaucracies that 
were both meritocratic and ‘coherent’ – having corporate objectives, values and norms that are widely 
observed; 6) Significant movement between senior political and bureaucratic positions; and 7) 
Bureaucracies that were often subsumed within the dominant political party (Dasaandi 2014:4). 
In developmental states, therefore, politicians and bureaucrats work closely together and there is little 
separation of roles between the two. However, politicians and civil servants have differing roles. 
It is highlighted that "the work of the civil service requires a “fine balance” between being neutral and non-
political and being politically sensitive and responsive" (speech of Prime Minister Lee on 26, 2016 April at the 
Administrative Service promotion ceremony). 
In summary, it can be said that a strong and effective public service should have several key defining 
features. As already pointed out a public service belongs to and is a key component of the state apparatus. There 
must be a strong organic link between the Public service and the state. This entails a shared vision and total 
acceptance by the public service of the value ends of organizational action set by the state. Within the context of 
competitive multi-party politics, it entails neutrality from partisan politics while committing to and championing 
national interests. 
This paper aims to scrutinize the politics - bureaucracy relations that occurred in Ethiopian civil service 
especially in the federal institutions. This is approached from the developmental states perspective. By doing so, 
the chapter discusses and answers the research question: How do politicians and bureaucrats interact with each 
other within the context in which they operate; and how the relationship influences the functions of public 
service? In search for answer/answers for this research question, variables which are vital for good relation 
between political executives and civil servants are discussed. Accordingly, Shared values and vision; and 
Influence of bureaucrats in policy design are the variables which are used to asses a relationship between 
political executives and civil servants. 
 
2. Statement of the Problem 
Public services belong to and are key components of the state apparatus. They depend on the concrete 
functioning of the state. Consequently, they derive their vision and mission from the vision and mission of a 
particular state at a particular point in time and contribute to the functioning, and effectiveness of the state. 
Hence, public services must have key features that reflect their organic relationship with the state.  
Ethiopia has officially been branding herself as developmental state since the early 2000s. In the context of 
developmental state, a basic framework of a public administration might be seen as incorporating a highly 
competitive, extensive, relatively efficient and effective public bureaucracy. Thus, the creation of a meritocratic 
bureaucracy and extensive state capacity is also required; and it is a central task (Acemoglu et al. 2001:29). 
Therefore, Public service, in a developmental state context means: “an efficient and effective state 
administration or apparatus; one that is committed to clearly outlined and systematically implemented 
development plans and programs that consciously seek to address poverty and underdevelopment” (Maphunye J. 
2009:1).  
Cognizant to this argument, therefore, as a developmental state, Ethiopia needs to have a public service 
which is competent, professional, autonomous, and strong among other qualities; if it desires to use the state as a 
very important vehicle to realize its developmental objectives.  
However, many researches on Ethiopian developmental state (see for example, UNDP, 2012; Tesfaye 2011; 
Desta 2012; Fantini 2013) mention many virtues which the Ethiopian public bureaucracy lacks Vis –a –Vis 
developmental state qualities. Inter alia, lack of professionalism and commitment needed to mobilize the limited 
resources of the state for development (Desta Asayehgn 2012:7); lack of political neutrality of the bureaucracy 
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(Tesfaye n.d:1); lack of institutional autonomy (Desta 2012:5; Fantini 2013:4) are said to be the traps that 
impede the bureaucracy from accomplishing its raison d’être. In the same line of critics, Tesfaye (n.d:1) stated 
that “civil service structures and other benefits generated by state – led development were frequently 
manipulated by the government apparatus and ruling elites as a source of patronage”. What is more, bureaucratic 
elites who design and manage Ethiopia’s short and long-term plans are not politically neutral.  
In this juncture, therefore, it is imperative to question why the Ethiopian civil service has failed to 
effectively realize its mission - effective implementation of developmental objectives. To this effect, looking at 
the Ethiopian civil service and searching for the developmental civil service attributes which Ethiopian civil 
service misses, in this regard, is a critical task.  
This research, therefore, has made the attempt to scrutinize the Ethiopian public bureaucracy in terms of its 
relationship with politics.   
 
3. Objective of the Study 
The overall objective of this study is examining the nature of interface between leaders in political office and the 
bureaucracy in the Ethiopian civil service.  
The specific objectives are: 
1. To scrutinize weather the politicians and the civil servants do share common Values and Objectives in 
Ethiopian Civil Service; 
2. To evaluate the level of understanding and commitment of the politicians and the civil servants towards 
the mission and policies of their respective ministries; 
3. To evaluate and level the Position of Bureaucrats in Policy Making-Processes; and 
4. To provide workable recommendations based on the findings and developmental state literature. 
 
4.  Research Questions 
This research is guided by the main research question: What is the nature of interface between leaders in political 
office and the bureaucracy in the Ethiopian civil service? The research also sets the following pertinent specific 
research questions: 
1. Do politicians and civil servants share common Values and Objectives in Ethiopian Civil Service? 
2. To what extent the politicians and the civil servants do understand and are committed to Mission and 
Policies of their respective ministries? 
3. What is the Position of Bureaucrats in Policy Making-Processes? 
4. What appropriate masseurs shall be taken to build up developmental civil service? 
 
II. Methodology 
• Qualitative Case Study Approach 
The research approach is basically qualitative in nature and mixed methods are used as data collection 
techniques so that supplementary quantitative data are used in simple descriptive statistics. Using qualitative 
research methods give the opportunity to dive deeper into the investigated phenomenon. Strategically, this 
qualitative research employed an exploratory and explanatory research with certain shared characteristics of 
descriptive research. It is a holistic multi – case study research, but the researcher is critical of weather the 
results can be applied in different contexts.  
• Data Sources and Data Collection Instruments 
The study has collected, collated and analyzed both primary and secondary data. The actual data collection has 
covered key offices within the public service which are selected purposely. To this effect, three ministries: 
Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, and Ministry 
of Industry which are purposely selected for their strong relevance vis-à-vis the issue under study.   
As to secondary data, various materials including periodicals, books, and a range of relevant sources which 
are combined with data from previous official studies such as reports on progress, evaluation and seminars, and 
unpublished reports are searched.  
The instruments that have been used for collecting data are in-depth interview with key informants; focus 
group discussions; and document analysis. The total of sixty-three personnel which include senior officers, 
senior experts, team leaders, and technical experts, from the three ministries have participated in interview, and 
focus group discussions. The same group and number of personnel also filled in the questioner. These peoples 
have been specifically selected for their specific knowledge of the information needed for the study.  A review 
and analysis of documents also has enabled the research not only to look for facts, but also to read between the 
lines and pursue corroborative evidence elsewhere.  
 
III. Data Presentation and Analysis 
1. Assessment of Shared Values and Objectives in Ethiopian Civil Service 
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There are important factors that shape the politics-bureaucracy interface and its impact on policy; these factors 
are also the drivers of attitudes and behaviors. Shared values and objectives is the most important factor for 
smooth relationship between political executive and civil servants so as to effectively implement policies. 
Positive and close working relationship between political and bureaucratic leaders, in developmental states, was 
central to their transformation. In many of the developmental states, politicians and bureaucrats had common 
ends and visions. There, civil servants and politicians shared development-focused values and objectives – 
something that the political leaders actively fostered. This shared developmental vision was seen as key to the 
success of these countries.  
The notion of an esprit de corps among politicians and bureaucrats is identified in virtually all accounts of 
developmental states. Some unwritten conventions between politicians and civil servants construct a shared 
understanding that impacts the functioning of their relation. A key argument in the literature on developmental 
states is that political leaders actively sought to promote values based on public service, nation building and 
development. As Saxena (2011: 38) describes, in the case of Singapore, for example, the People’s Action Party 
(PAP) government ‘did expect the civil service to be aligned to its vision.’ 
Yet, while it is not possible to replicate developmental states’ model elsewhere in Ethiopia, lessons across 
different contexts suggest characteristics of the sort of political-administrative interaction that supports the 
development of developmental bureaucracy. The question here is, therefore, how these states managed building 
this shared value and objective. A number of factors are said to have contributed to the closeness of this 
relationship between political leaders and bureaucrats in developmental states. 
• Vision Guidance and Shared Vision 
As far as the relationship between bureaucracy and politics is concerned, the general expectation regarding 
politics bureaucracy relationship is that a shared vision and a total acceptance by the Public service of the value 
ends of organizational action set by the state.  
After the completion of the five years development plan called the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained 
Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), in 2010, the grand developmental plan with clearly stated long term 
vision, the GTP, was launched. In what seems a differing attribute than its predecessors, the GTP stipulates 
Ethiopia’s vision as: " . . . to become a country where democratic rule, good governance and social justice reign, 
upon the involvement and free will of its peoples, and once extricating itself from poverty to reach the level of 
middle-income economy as of 2020-2023” (MoFED 2010: 21). 
Besides the democratic values embedded in the overall vision, the GTP further explicates the vision on 
poverty alleviation by giving specifics on the aspects of the economic vision. It says that Ethiopia’s vision 
specifically on economic sector includes:  
Building an economy which has a modern and productive agricultural sector with enhanced technology 
and an industrial sector that plays a leading role in the economy, sustaining economic development and 
securing social justice and increasing per capita income of the citizens so as to reach the level of those 
in middle-income countries (MoFED, 2010: 21) 
The first phase of this overarching plan, extending for five years, 2010/11 to 2014/15 and covering a wide 
range of economic and infrastructural development has been completed and the second GTP is currently 
underway. The explicitly stated emphasis on economic development and the clarity of goals, such as eradication 
of poverty and elevating the country into a middle-income status by a definite date, indicate the developmentalist 
orientation of the contemporary Ethiopian state. Put differently, it can be argued that the Ethiopian state already 
has the requisite ideological orientation (Sisay and Regassa, cited in Ayenachew 2014).  
However, many reports of ministry of Public Service and Human Resource (the then ministry of Civil 
service and Good Governance) (see for example, 2014/15 and 2015/16 annual reports) revealed that most of the 
higher leadership both at the federal and regional governments were unable to clearly define and set the missions 
and visions of their respective institutions based on context and respective environment. For this reason, they 
were also unable to lead, monitor and evaluate their respective institutions.  
Thus, it is important to make sure that everyone has a clear understanding of his/her responsibilities. 
Officials must deliver a strong professional commitment to their respective institution’s missions and objectives. 
Both must work together to deliver the best outcomes available in the political space and to help wider society 
trust that it is getting a good deal. 
To improve internal and external engagement in the work of the Civil Service, to clearly communicate the 
role of the Civil Service and to ensure that accurate, relevant and timely information about the Civil Service is 
accessible and available to both staff and stakeholders. Close relationship between political leaders and 
bureaucrats is fostered by a set of shared values (Charlton, 1991; Leftwich, 1995). When political executives and 
civil servants have shared values, it is likely for them to pursue a specific common goal. In other words, they 
want to obtain certain policy outcome, indicating what they want to realize in the society at large. Thus, there has 
to be a sort of goal consensus. The point is that both parties, i.e., political executives and civil servants should 
agree that the goal of their cooperation is serving the public interest. To build and reach at some sort of common 
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understanding, "both parties need correct information, and this information should be as symmetric as possible 
divided between civil servants or political executives" (Schreurs et al. nd: 25).  Thus, everything that happens in 
the public service should be accessible for all citizens. Accordingly, transparency and accessibility of 
information, not confidentiality, have primary importance. 
The next issue is, therefore, exploring whether this vision is shared among the political leadership and 
between the political leadership and the civil service. Therefore, it is sound to look at whether Ethiopian public 
administration possesses factors that lead to the creation of shared values and visions. To this effect, it is 
important to address pertinent questions, like: 
1. What fosters the creation of an esprit de corps among politicians and bureaucrats that focuses on promoting 
development within a country? 
2.  What prevents the creation of such a shared set of values and objectives? 
A) Class and educational background 
Common background of political leadership is said to have a positive impact on the leadership of developmental 
states in sharing common visions and values. Part of the explanation for the shared set of values and vision 
among politicians and bureaucrats in developmental states is that they often had similar class and/or higher 
education backgrounds. In the case of Japan, for example, Johnson (1982: 57-59) emphasizes the important role 
of the gakubatsu, the ties among classmates from elite university – particularly, the alumni of Tokyo University 
Law School (see also Evans 1989). This was also the case with South Korea, where the majority of those who 
passed the civil service entrance examination were from Seoul National University, and 40% had come from two 
prestigious secondary schools in Seoul (Kim 2007). Similarly, in the case of Botswana, significant attention has 
been given to senior politicians and bureaucrats coming from the same cattle-owning class (see Charlton 1991; 
Acemoglu et al. 2001). In Singapore, political leaders and senior bureaucrats had formed close ties at elite 
universities before entering public service. Politicians and bureaucrats tended to be ‘English-educated middle-
class men' (Saxena 2011: 40). 
Currently, as far as the background is concerned, Ethiopian political leadership is diverse. At least three 
group of leadership can be identified. The first group consists of politicians and senior civil servants who were 
attending the same universities and schools. The group also emerged from student organizations and study 
groups at Addis Ababa University in the 1960s and the 1970s. Hence, the school link is a common ground for 
these prominent leaders. What is more, the current core political leadership, particularly those who come from 
ANDM and TPLF; and partly from OPDO and SEPDM have their background to the student movement and the 
subsequent political organizations that went to armed struggle. Attending the same schools and being members 
of political groups in the protracted armed struggle, this group is likely to share same values and vision. It is 
mainly this group that has adopted and moved forwards the ideals of developmentalism.  
The second category of political leadership refers to those who were not in the armed struggle and joined 
the leadership in post 1991. This group had a very diverse background and different interests. The only common 
background this group may share with the first group, if mentioning worth, is that the majority of them were 
strong ethno - nationalists. Thus, almost all of the leaders came from political organizations that represent 
respective ethnic group’s interest, not national interest. For this reason, there have been networks based on kin, 
ethnicity, or region, which tend to promote the use of public office for the advantage of group members, rather 
than for broader national development goals. Similar views, of course, have been consistently reflected by the 
incumbent. For example, Addis Raey1 (2017) stated that narrow ethno - centrism and chauvinism are the main 
threats of the regime and also the country.  According to this document, significant numbers of politicians and 
senior bureaucrats have been observed to give priority to the demands of those in their kin group.  
The third collection is relatively junior and is mainly formed through informal networks based on 
friendship, business and patronage. This view argues that many of the top leadership has come together not on 
common backgrounds but based on common current interest – rent - seeking. Observers assert that such informal 
networks have prevented the formation of a shared development-oriented ethos among politicians and 
bureaucrats. Instead, wide rent- seeking networks have been established and have exacerbated the problems of 
good governance and corruption.  
Here, what is also important to note is that the role of leadership is also central to the formation of a 
development-centered ethos among politicians and bureaucrats. This has been mentioned in studies that consider 
widespread bureaucratic corruption. Studies note that, for example, if corruption is prevalent among political 
leaders, it is almost inevitable that the bureaucracy will be afflicted by systematic corruption (Hyden et al. 2003; 
Evans 1989). This is to say that behavior in the civil service is very much dependent on how the political 
leadership behaves. If the elected politicians are not corrupt, they tend to set an example that is emulated in the 
bureaucracy. If, they are corrupt, this tends to spread to the civil service too. Thus, it is logical to conclude that it 
                                                          
1
 'Addis Raey’ in Amharic, meaning 'new vision’ is the bi - monthly ideological indoctrination magazine of the ruling party, 
EPRDF. 
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.8, No.7, 2018 
 
48 
is, unlike many developmental states, the political leadership in Ethiopian public administration failed to make 
the bureaucracy developmental. This is because the leadership lacks solid unity around the values and vision of 
developmentalism. 
Therefore, it can be said that, the current political leadership is the combination of three different groups. 
This diversity is in terms of both background and interest. This is to say that there is little in common among the 
political leadership to share with. It can be said that all groups come to leadership not because they share 
common causes but with the desire to maximize group and/or individual self-interests.  
On this same issue, key informants, mainly veteran politicians and senior public service officials, 
demonstrate that the first-generation leaders were relatively homogenous in terms of, at least, ideological 
orientation. As a result, the leadership in this group shared common national values under similar vision 
guidance. In addition, the role of this group in inculcating the ideals of developmentalism and binding 
cohesiveness of the leadership was critical.  However, through time, as the leadership circle increases in size, the 
heterogeneity of the leadership increased. At the same time the role of ideology, value and vision as connecting 
factor gradually eroded. Instead, ethnicity, and informal rent- seeking networks have become dominant factors of 
group cohesiveness. In the whole, the fact that particularly the political leadership is most often perceived as 
very homogeneous by the outside observers; however, the inner look does in fact show a slightly different 
picture. Therefore, divergent interests, values and visions are apparent among the leadership. As a result, the 
leadership lacks the very important quality of developmental leadership.  
B) Political continuity and Development success 
Political continuity is viewed as an important factor in promoting an esprit de corps among politicians and 
bureaucrats in developmental states (Leftwich 1995). In Singapore, for example, the continued rule of the 
People’s Action Party helped promote the shared values and goals of politicians and bureaucrats (Saxena 2011). 
Likewise, in Botswana, as noted previously, the BDP party’s long rule was important.  
More frequent political change makes it much more difficult to create the shared values and objectives 
among politicians and bureaucrats that are a hallmark of political-administrative relations in developmental 
states - because different political leaders have different objectives. As different studies, for example, Smith 
(2009) point out, those bureaucrats may be more resistant to implementing changes promoted by politicians, on 
the basis that the same political leaders may not be in power after the next election. In Botswana, for example, 
the ruling BDP party has been in power since the country’s independence. This political continuity has enabled a 
close relationship to develop shared values and objectives. 
Despite the fact that political discontinuity is not a challenge so far and there is a visible progress in the 
country’s economic growth, the Ethiopian developmental state is challenged in its move forward by both internal 
and external forces. One such pertinent challenge is the existence of chronic political difference impeding the 
possibility of consensus on major issues. Of course, one of the typical characteristics of the Ethiopian political 
landscape is the diametric differences on almost all important national issues that are so strong and emotionally 
charged that political dialogue among the elites is hardly possible. Many of the differences are fundamental to 
the views of different political groups on issues such as ethno - linguistic federalism as a political arrangement, 
the appropriateness of revolutionary democracy as an ideology, the development of democratic process in the 
country, conditions of human rights and political freedom, etc.  
In the same token, the development success of a country has also been highlighted as a key factor in 
reinforcing the shared ethos between politicians and bureaucrats. In the case of Botswana, for example, rapid 
economic growth following independence was a key factor in reinforcing the ‘ideology of developmentalism’ 
that permeated the political leadership and bureaucracy (Charlton 1991). 
In this regard, the government of Ethiopia claims that it is creating rich farmers in the rural areas and 
emerging private investors, through micro and small businesses, in the urban areas. However, this is highly 
contested by opposition and critics. For this group of people, macro-economic conditions such as the ever-
increasing income gap, too much dependence on foreign aid than private investment, uncontrolled inflation, 
imbalanced development between the urban and rural areas and the small size but highly corrupt private sector 
are in the list of challenges to the Ethiopian developmental state.  
In East Asian developmental states, national consensus among the nations was a great contributing factor 
for their success in economic development. National consensus in countries like Ethiopia, where there are 
diverse ethnic groups and a country claiming developmental state is paramount. The developmental state in 
Ethiopia also has tried a lot to develop national consensus against poverty. However, there are still challenges to 
include all the nations as the situation needs. There are ideas that move against the direction of the 
developmental state in Ethiopia.  
As a result, years after Ethiopia has officially claimed to have adopted the developmental state model, there 
is still fierce debate and disagreement continuing on such basic issues as: what is a developmental state? is 
developmental state relevant to Ethiopia? what type of developmental state should Ethiopia follow? which 
country should be a model for Ethiopia to learn from? and so on. 
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Besides, the lower level structure of the public administration is highly charged with the tension of the 
ethnic politics that is producing a “negative impact on the creation of civic country wide citizenship for 
successful developmental state” Bonda cited in (Ayenachew 2014:34). To lead the transformation with 
legitimacy and credibility, therefore, the state has to work on these issues of differences as much as it is working 
on economic growth.  
2. Understanding of and Commitment to Mission and Policies 
The agencies comprising the federal bureaucracy have specific duties, termed “missions” and hire individuals 
who are assigned specific tasks. Commitment to social objectives is one thing and dancing to the tune of a 
political party is another. In practice, however, commitment has assumed the perverted form of politicization and 
sycophancy. 
In developmental states, regardless historical and cultural traditions in each country, the civil service has 
always had the same mission and the same tasks to carry out, i.e. to ensure professional, reliable, impartial and 
politically neutral execution of the tasks of the State. No matter which party is in government, public officials are 
supposed to pursue its policy with equal competence and dedication. 
Very often, it is seen that the Ethiopian bureaucracy simply acts according to the dictates of the political 
executive without any independent examination of issues. This trend can be attributed to the ever-growing 
political interference in the affairs of administration. Political interference and impartial administration cannot 
co-exist. While the administrators do not perceive their role in policy making as subservient to the political 
leaders because of their knowledge and expertise, yet they have to conform to the prerequisites of representative 
politics. The political leaders claim to be the true representatives of the people and know what is good for them 
and because of their superior position succeed in dictating the terms to the bureaucrats. The bureaucrats who are 
not obliging enough soon find themselves in trouble. The political masters have many means of coercion – both 
overt and covert. Political interference in all matters including those where the statutory power is vested in the 
civil servants is a constant phenomenon.  
At ministry level, both the top officials and experts need to understand the mission and policies attached to 
respective ministries. Without clear understanding of mission and policies, a given ministry cannot fulfil its role. 
As a result, it hinders the overall efforts of development by causing implementation trap. Hence, it leads to the 
proposition that political executives and civil servants must understand that they occupy strategic positions in 
Government. 
In this regard, various government documents, interviews and discussions with politicians and civil servants 
reveal that lack of commitment and understanding of missions and policies of respective ministries are 
challenging implementation of government policies.  For example, a state minister, who was a key informant in 
one of the ministries not only expressed his dissatisfaction with the performance of bureaucracy, he alleged that 
the bureaucrats lack commitment. He referred to the administrative machinery as ‘the stumbling block' in the 
country’s progresses and stresses the necessity of creating an administrative cadre committed to national 
objectives and responsive to Ethiopia's developmental needs.  
Similarly, the reports of ministry of Public Service and Human Resource (the then ministry of Civil service 
and Good Governance) (see for example, 2014/15 and 2015/16 annual reports) disclose that there is critical 
capacity gap and lack of commitment on the side of higher leadership. The top leadership of regional and city 
administration civil services, including both appointed politicians and senior bureaucrats, lack: 
full understanding of government policies and directions, essence of renaissance, and development 
plans in their respective leadership; strong commitment in the struggle against rent - seeking 
attitudes and behaviors and actions as well as taking corrective measures to solve problems related 
to good governance; appropriate leadership in leading the development/change army by 
understanding their role from the national and developmental viewpoint. Because of this, the 
implementation of the set objective is between 75% and 50% (2014/15 annual evaluation report, 
MoCSGG). 
Such problems are also, according to one of the interviewed state ministers, similar to middle level and 
lower level leaders. Most of the middle level leaders come to civil service from various political posts in wereda 
and city administrations. They are recruited basically not for their merit but for their political loyalty. So, they 
are not familiar with the missions and objectives of their respective ministries and departments for which they 
are responsible.  
The problem in this regard is that, in such an environment same product, services are given in no uniform 
manner to its users. The members of an institution will not have equal knowledge of same issue, organizational 
culture, routine tasks, objective, vision and goal or the ethics needed by the establishment they are working for. 
On this same issue, civil servants were interviewed in the case ministries. Interviewees were asked two 
questions to notice whether civil servants share sense of missions; and if they are committed to policies of their 
respective ministries. Their responses confirm the assertions of both the reports of the ministry of public service 
and human resource and that of the state minister. 
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As it reads from table 1, the significant majority (77.6%) of the respondents said they do not share sense of 
their respective ministries’ mission. Similarly, 58.8% of the respondents replied that they do not strive towards 
the implementation of the policies.  The messages are clear: the majority of the civil servants lack the minimum 
requirement – understanding and sharing the mission of their respective institutions which is reason d’être of 
any institution.  In other words, they do not know their ministry’s contribution to the public and to the whole 
national development. They also lack commitment to implement the policies of their ministries under their 
jurisdiction.  If one fails to understand the mission of his/her institution, he/she cannot understand his/her 
importance and contribution in the institution.  
As a result, such a civil servant does not know what to do and why to do. Thus, not only sharing visions and 
missions of the civil service, it is unlikely to understand the responsibilities as an individual civil servant.  In 
such circumstances, it is not logical to expect vision sharing and commitment. 
For a minister, it is common to staff his/her own choice. Specially, the posts of the advisor and the 
directorate directors are recognized as incontestably the minister's personal appointment. Not infrequently, the 
minister chooses such people either through recommendation or network. The problem, in this regard, is that the 
majority of the officials staffed by the minister's personal appointment are without the necessary qualifications. 
Their experience and knowledge regarding the posts they hold is lower than the experts under their office. 
Because there is difference between senior civil servants and middle and lower rank civil servants, it is highly 
unlikely that they will share the sense of mission. Senior Civil Service in politically dependent civil service 
system will stress the compliance in their day-to-day actions, as they can be replaced by the minister at any time.  
The researcher’s observation also complements the reports of ministry of Public service and Human 
resource. The researcher participated in many discussions where ministers, state ministers, and directorate 
directors of one of the case ministries vis. ministries of Industry. In such discussions, research findings related to 
issues which are under the jurisdiction of the ministry, were presented by some research institute and there were 
many points of disagreements among the top leaders of the ministry. Their points of departure were not limited 
to the findings of the researches but also to the very mandate and mission of the ministry. In this regard, it will 
be helpful to see two issues that created disagreement among the leadership.  The first is related to the 
jurisdiction of the ministry. Here, the point up on which they failed to reach an agreement was that weather 
attracting to and managing investment in regional states is the jurisdiction of the ministry or not.  
The second issue is related to the very pillar of the industry policy of the country. The research finding 
stressed that domestic investment is the engine of our industrialization per the policy, however, little attention is 
given to the domestic investment and consequently failed to play its crucial role in industrializing the country. 
Contrary to this argument, the leaders of the ministry said that it is not the domestic investment that plays crucial 
role in industrializing the country but the foreign one. On this very policy issue higher officials debated and 
failed to reach an agreement. 
So, what is the implication of these facts? First, the top leaders do not have common understanding on the 
objectives and mandate of their respective ministries. Second, the leaders do not understand, even the pillars of 
main policies. As a result, they strive towards different ends. This, in turn, leads to in cohesive leadership with 
less esprit de corps. Consequently, it hinders the implementation of developmental state objectives in respective 
ministries.   
The lack of clarity and incompetence among the lower level hierarchy of government structure is another 
serious challenge. The implementation of developmental policies is being undertaken by people of least 
competence. There seems to be a paucity of solidified understanding about what developmental state is and how 
Ethiopia is embracing it. However, many of the middle level civil servants who were interviewed and those 
participated in focus group discussions identified themselves as having adequate information about missions, 
general strategies and principles of respective ministry. 
Government makes particular decisions, identifies priorities and government structure is adapted to 
these priorities. For instance, nowadays the main priority is to attract foreign investment; accordingly, 
the ministry tries to attract investments and ensure that foreign money—as much as possible—enters 
Ethiopia and creates employment opportunities (one of the respondents in ministry of Industry). 
As for the strategy, our particular ministry has an action plan as its strategy. The main priorities and 
activities are defined in this strategy; in particular, what is a priority this year, what should be 
implemented, how it should be implemented and what results should be achieved (one of the 
respondents). 
I have an experience of working in different public service offices and it is different everywhere. In 
some cases, strategies are well defined, in others - not so well (one of the respondents). 
Thus, the logical question that follows should be, if there is no gap in understanding the main strategies and 
objectives of their respective ministry, what is the problem to strive towards those goals? 
Strategies and policies are well known among civil servants. Much training has been given on main 
policies and philosophy of developmentalism. The problem, I think, is lack of internalizing and 
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devoting towards the implementation of the policies and strategies. For me the relevant matter is that 
one should be sincere and genuine, taking work close to one’s heart (one of the respondents). 
Hence, it can be said that one of the pillars of the developmental bureaucracy - shared values, consensus on 
objectives and esprit de corps are missed. Regarding this, De Waal (2013) warns that in a country as wide and 
diverse as Ethiopia, implementing a policy without creating a common mind set first runs the risk of 
degenerating the principles, no matter how sophisticated the theoretical foundations are, in to a set of dogma 
parroted by party cadres, with hardly any understanding of the real meaning and implication of the policies and 
strategies. Confusion between political and developmental goals along with the incompetence of the bureaucracy 
and the growing of individual and group interests contest the effective implementation of the development 
policies at the grassroots level. 
 
3 The Position of Bureaucrats in Policy Making-Processes 
One of the basic characteristics of the Weberian ideal/legal rational bureaucracy is that bureaucrats should be 
politically neutral. That is, bureaucrats are not expected to be involved in the process of policy making, but 
rather they are only expected to implement policies made by the executive arm of government. What this 
suggests is that the elected political executives or appointed cabinet ministers are expected to make laws, while 
the bureaucrats take order from the executive for the implementation of the policies formulated. The top 
bureaucrats could at best play advisory roles to the politicians in the process of policy making. Going by this 
Weberian principle of political neutrality for bureaucrats, it is only technocrats who are appointed by the 
executive head of government as cabinet ministers play any major role in the process of policy formulation. 
Politics has been identified as a key issue to understand policy management. Though not in Weberian sense, 
policy making in neo patrimonial regimes is totally dominated by political elite. It has been observed by Hyden 
(2006) that in neo-patrimonial systems the president and other politicians at the top play a significant role in 
policy implementation. He postulates that because African governments do not control power, politics emerges 
as supreme and undermines other rational bases for policy determination; subsequently, a policy deficit is 
caused. The transition from the movement type of politics to competitive politics has further compounded this 
problem because the ruling will ensure that there is total monopoly over state resources (Lindberg 2003:123). 
This, according to the author, leads those in power to become directly involved in policy management even 
where the work would have been delegated to street level bureaucrats. 
Like many other developing countries, undue pervasive political influence on the public is one of the 
constraining factors to effective policy implementation in Ethiopian public administration. Usually, the political 
leaders formulate policies and as well control and direct the implementation activities of the policy. This 
situation is not proper as such controls and directives are mostly motivated by selfish personal or political 
interests. Indeed, the bureaucracy cannot effectively implement policies and meaningfully contribute to national 
development if it is fettered, controlled and directed by political authorities. This is more so, since in extreme 
cases, of such political control, the bureaucrats are not even allowed to take decisions or actions on basic routine 
administrative matters without consultation and the consent of relevant political authorities. In this process, 
much time and energy are wasted and prompt actions required for effective implementation of policies 
hampered.  
The developmental state literature, however, negates this principle of political neutrality for bureaucrats in 
the process of developmental policy formulation and implementation. Instead of only focusing on the 
implementation of policy by the bureaucrats, the developmental state’s orthodoxy holds strongly that bureaucrats 
remain necessary institutions for a state to achieve development. It is within this context that an attempt would 
be made under this section to examine the roles of the technocrats as well as the bureaucrats in the process of 
developmental policy making and implementation. 
One of the major issues concerning the politics - bureaucracy relation is the power, or the role of political 
executive and bureaucracy in the policy-making processes. That process consists of several steps: agenda setting, 
policy formulation, policy decision-making, policy implementation, and policy evaluation. In search for clarity, 
in this study the policy cycle is divided into two parts: developing policy and implementing policy.  
Roughly put, one could say that there exist three different types of tasks, that are dealt with by different 
types of civil servants (Smith, 1988), namely: direct servicing of wishes, requests and needs of people (this type 
is dealt with by administrative or lower civil servants); coordinating and organizing of the administration unit 
performance (type that is managed by mangers or higher civil servants); and preparations, development and 
evaluation of public policies (that type is handled by public policy designers or high civil servants).  
Given this, therefore, one can posit that the extent to which politics influence the bureaucratic activities will 
continue to determine and shape the extent to which policies can be properly and effectively implemented by the 
public bureaucracy in Ethiopian public service. The influence the bureaucrats can have on policy design and 
execution depends on the type of the relationship that exists between them. Literature on public administration 
continues to debate, sometimes contentiously, over the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in the 
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policy making process. That debate has concentrated on the inability to draw a line, even a fine one, between the 
two roles and, conversely, to indicate where they converge in the policymaking and implementation processes.  
The problem also has much to do with the liberal democratic ethos that entrusts elected officials with policy 
making, while the bureaucracy is seen as subservient to those officials, whose decisions they are expected to 
implement (Montjoy and Watson 1995). The reality in the ground of effective public administration, however, 
demonstrates that the role of politicians is to set priorities and policy directions, to make political decisions 
taking into consideration public needs and requirements. Administrators are involved in both the formulation and 
the implementation of public policy. Because policy decisions profoundly influence who gets what, this 
involvement in policy inevitably involves them in politics (Starling 1982). Starling further asserts that purely 
administrative matters can seldom be separated from politics and administrators also become involved in policy 
formulation when they recommend amendments to existing laws to the Legislature. Civil service organizations 
are closest to where the action is and therefore are more likely to see imperfections and incompleteness in the 
laws. Indeed, legislatures expect that those who deal continuously with problems will suggest improvements 
(starling 1982).  
In the same line of argument, Dye (1995:312) confirms that “bureaucrats hire personnel, draw up contracts, 
spend money and perform tasks. All of these activities involve decisions by bureaucrats – decisions that 
determine policy. As society has grown in size and complexity, the bureaucracy has increased its role in the 
policy - process.” Dye (1995:313) further asserts that policy implementation often requires the development of 
formal rules and regulations by bureaucracies. 
In carrying out its role, a bureaucracy does not only serve to implement policies made by the decision 
makers, but also runs policy mostly made its own, such as technical guidelines, circulars and others. The strong 
role of bureaucracy in policy process is also caused by several factors that are the source of power of 
bureaucracy, as suggested by Mas'oed, cited in Azhari (2015), a) Its role as the personification of the state: A 
bureaucracy carries out all its duties, like tax collection, justice, and wide range of other bureaucratic role on 
behalf of the state. It is at the front side of the government where the government and the people interface. In 
personifying the state, a bureaucracy claims also obedience from citizens.  b) Mastery of information: In carrying 
out its daily duties, a bureaucracy collects records that contain almost all areas of society and state activities. 
This role gives a bureaucracy a privilege, which politicians do not have, to identify areas that need a policy 
intervention. A bureaucracy can then influence politicians to adopt policies to their liking; and c) The ownership 
of technical expertise: provide that the bureaucracy is recruited in a meritocracy; one cannot deny that the 
bureaucracy has the technical expertise which is needed in decision-making. Mastery of information and 
technical ability is extraordinary source of strength for the bureaucracy.  
The implication from the arguments above is that there is a wide range of expectations of an effective civil 
service. These include the ability to deliver government policy; help formulate that policy; and challenge policy 
to ensure that it is workable. In policy- making processes, therefore, the role of the civil servants slowly shifted 
through time from servant of politics to relatively equivalent to one of the politics. 
Civil servants in developmental states play critical roles in policy designing and implementation. In view of 
that, a defining characteristic of policy-making in developmental states is that the significant influence that 
senior bureaucrats – part of the developmental elite – have on policy design, particularly in comparison to 
western democracies (Johnson, 1982; Charlton, 1991; Leftwich 1995). This is to say that one of the common 
features of developmental public administration is that bureaucrats have more influence in designing policy than 
is usually the case. This influence is particularly important and prominent for key economic ministries and 
agencies, such as the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan (Johnson 1982). Similarly, in Botswana, 
bureaucrats have a huge amount of influence in the policy-making process, in terms of the initiation, design and 
implementation of policies (Charlton, 1991). Likewise, a key factor in Singapore’s development success was that 
the bureaucracy was given the autonomy to design, implement, and adapt economic policies. This was, in part, 
possible because of a largely meritocratic bureaucracy that recruited the country’s best graduates.  
Thus, among other factors, the extent to which recruitment and promotion in the civil service is based on 
merit is one of many contextual factors that shape the interaction between political and administrative leaders. 
This section explores whether civil servants have significant leverage on policy processes specially in 
developing policy. Usually, in the tradition of Ethiopian public administration, the state bureaucracy was seen as 
a mere implementation apparatus, with no role in policy development. There is no explicit legal statement as to 
the role of the bureaucracy in policy related issues. For example, the FDRE constitution is silent about the role of 
civil service in relation to policy process. Instead, it stipulates that the council of ministers “shall formulate and 
implement economic, social and development policies and strategies” Art 7(6).  By implication, the political 
executive both formulates and implements policies. As a result, the politico-executive function is seen as issuing 
policies, decrees and other by-laws in order to facilitate enforcement of laws and issuing directives on how 
certain legal acts should be implemented. In contrast, the administrative-executive function has been seen as 
mere law enforcement. 
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.8, No.7, 2018 
 
53 
Likewise, as to the relationship between political leadership and permanent executive, the current 
constitution does not regulate in an explicit manner. Other legal acts, though implicit, stipulate that the civil 
service should be non-partisan and professional in fulfilling its duties.  
The Federal Civil Service Proclamation (2007) reads: "Any civil servant shall:  
[1] be loyal to the public and the Constitution (61:1; [2] devote his whole energy and ability to the service of the 
public (61:2)". By implication, therefore, the law forbids the civil servants from partiality when fulfilling their 
office duties. They must not be guided by their political beliefs and other perceptions. However, they are not 
prohibited from being members and party supporters.   
The discussions and analysis of the empirical data in this chapter also provide evidence which indicate that, 
unlike many developmental states, politicians believe that they have fiduciary powers and, therefore, the 
prerogative to set policies, and that the administrators should obediently implement them. Such a view 
implicates, in case of policy formulation, that the Ethiopian public administration developed as almost a classical 
Weberian administration, where the civil service is only concerned with policy implementation, according to the 
law. This is contrary to the situation in many developmental states, where civil service has gained a virtual 
monopoly on policy development. This demonstrates a clear dichotomy between policy making and policy 
implementation. Therefore, it is possible to assert that the exclusion of the civil servants from policy formulation 
process continues and is a feature of the present civil service too. 
The data obtained from the interviews with key informants and focus group discussions confirm the above 
conclusions. Respondents were asked two questions in order to examine their view and engagement on a policy 
making process. First, they were asked if they consider policy making as one of their responsibilities. The second 
question was asked to know whether they engage in the policy making process or not.  
The result, as illustrated in table 2 above, shows that the majority of the respondents (61.9%) believe that 
policy making is under their jurisdiction. However, only 23.8% of the respondents said that civil servants engage 
in a policy formulation process. The figures in the table mean that though most civil servants perceive that civil 
servants’ participation in creating policy initiatives as appropriate, they do not engage in the process of policy 
making. Of course, the number of respondents who do not agree with civil servants' participation in policy 
making is also considerable, which is about 40%. What is more, there were few key informants who assert that 
policy making is not under their sphere of responsibilities. 
For example, a senior expert in ministry of civil service argued that: "Thinking about policies and later on 
identification of their strategies is not my direct responsibility. I am just an expert/a specialist. Accordingly, I am 
responsible for implementation of the strategies set by higher bodies". 
A related question that needs to be answered in this regard is 'why do civil servants participate less in policy 
making process while the majority of them believe policy making is part of their duties?' Interviews were 
conducted in order for answering this pertinent question and found some explanations. For example, one of the 
key informants said that "there are no institutionalized practices that allow the civil servants to formally engage 
in policy making processes. Instead, politicians have a monopoly on policymaking."  
Another senior civil servant stressed government’s unwillingness to encourage civil servant’s participation 
in policy design and stated that: 
The government is not keen to entrust additional responsibility to the civil service. It regarded the civil 
service as routine-minded, conservatives and lacking in the necessary commitment. Hence, it sought to 
restrict the civil service role to its traditional pursuits. Instead, the incumbent resorts to high level party 
officials constituted outside the official channels of the bureaucracy to initiate policy deliberations prior 
to legislative debates and executive assent and implementation.  
This shows that in addition to the absence of practical engagement in policy design, there is also 
unconscious acceptance of the dichotomy between policy making and policy implementation on the side of the 
civil servants; and this is not a healthy situation in the civil service under developmental state ideals. As a result, 
bureaucrats continue to be shut out of the policy making process. 
Challenges for absence of engagement of civil servants in policy making are, however, not limited to the 
beliefs of the civil servants and lack of institutionalized practices. There are also some other challenges that 
hinder the civil servants from meaningful participation in policy making process.  
 
4 Availability of Expertise and Informational Resources 
Expert knowledge is necessary in policy-making processes, since in these processes the problems of public 
policies are solved. Therefore, it is of high importance for people involved in policy-making processes to own 
such knowledge. It is believed that a policy-making process is owned primarily, if not exclusively, by 
administration. The possession of expert knowledge itself enables the bureaucrats to gain power in policy-
making processes. 
The key resource that bureaucrats can draw on is technical or informational resource, these being 
knowledge and expertise about different aspects of the political and policy process. Core competencies in policy 
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analysis and generalist skills that can be applied to different areas of policy and operations are essential and will 
always play an important role in the work of the civil service. However, this needs to be complemented by 
professional expertise in key functions. This is to say that for civil servants in general and senior civil servants in 
particular, to be able to effectively engage in policy making processes, relevant expertise and information are 
prerequisites, among other things.  
Weber noted that expertise represents the principal source of political power for bureaucracies; this is 
particularly so in countries where they are ‘often said to monopolize the knowledge and expertise relevant to 
government’ (Smith, 2009). Bureaucrats typically are assumed to possess greater substantive expertise on a 
specific policy issue and/or knowledge about government procedures than do politicians. It is also said that a 
principal reason for the influence of bureaucrats in the policymaking process in developmental states was their 
technical expertise.  
However, in Ethiopian context, unlike other developmental states’ bureaucracies, the lack of development 
of policy capacities by the bureaucracy is main factor in explaining absence of participation, let alone, influence 
on policy making from the side of the bureaucracy. Developing policy capacities in the administration is, 
therefore, an important issue.  
As a result, because the administration does not have monopoly on expert knowledge, politics can, 
therefore, (more or less) gain it from elsewhere and is not necessarily dependent on administration. This means, 
in addition to inner ways of providing expert knowledge and information, politics can use outer ways also. Best-
known outer ways of gaining expert knowledge and information are as follows: 
First, politicians have the opportunity to include in policy-making processes outer experts from different 
areas as their counselors.  The experts offer the politicians expertise and information. They work as individuals 
or as a group of experts. If they work as a group of experts, they usually have a special name. In many cases, the 
names that are used are something like: office or council of counselors (for a specific area: e.g. Council of 
economic advisors to the prime minister). These counselors can offer expert support regularly or periodically.  
Second, specialized analytical organizations have been formed recently and they work on one or many 
policy areas. They possess knowledge and since they are established for policy research and advice. Politicians 
(ministers) can work with them for advising. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the federal policy study and 
research center (PSRC). The Centre was established by the Council of Ministers in March 2014 with the primary 
mission of conducting policy study and research. The center is a major policy research institute with the 
principal mission to study local and international issues and to formulate and propose policy and strategic ideas 
essential for the development of the country. The government uses this center whenever policy revision and 
formulation of new policies are planned. 
However, since both arrangements are external to the bureaucracy, it can be said that the policy making is 
mainly the task of political leadership and experts outside of the civil service. Thus, no or little role is left for 
civil servants in policy making process. 
What is more, key informants as well as focus group discussion participants were asked whether experts 
and senior bureaucrats have the capability to influence the policies of their respective ministries. Generally 
speaking, their view is that the existing middle and senior level managers are not in a position, let alone 
influencing policies, majority of them are not familiar with their posts. For instance, a senior trainer and 
consultant in the area of civil service capacity building explains the case as: 
The majority of the middle and senior level civil servants come in from outside the ministry have come 
from local government services for either their political affiliation or being in the network of the 
minister or state minister in a given ministry. Indeed, when top managers are appointed through 
political considerations rather than by merit and competence, the likely result is that such officers are 
incapable of meeting the expectations of this high office and advising impartially without fear or 
favour. It becomes even more unthinkable and miserable for the system if the incompetence is led at the 
top by the political executive.  
She continued explaining: “There is also a situation where the ministry gets a dynamic minister who wants 
the job done with high quality and innovatively and top bureaucrats are incapable of providing quality advice to 
achieve the goals of the ministry”.  
Hence, policy capacities remain a highly underdeveloped quality in Ethiopian public administration and it 
would be important to prioritize their development. The politicization of top level appointments was also seen as 
one of the factors in the weakening of policy related engagements, as professional capacity at senior level 
declined. 
 
5 The Practical Exclusion of Civil Servants from the Policy Development Process 
Policy development is still predominantly carried out outside the administration in many ministries. The role of 
civil servants as professional advisors on the substance of policy has hardly been developed. Politicians 
generally rely heavily on political advisors, from outside the administration, when it comes to the development 
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of policy and strategy. 
In this regard, the observation of the researcher and discussions held with senior civil servants give an idea 
that even the appointed policy advisors in the ministries do not engage themselves in policy related activities, 
instead they act as if they were personal aid for their respective ministers. This non-engagement of the advisors 
in policy related activities partially related to their noticeable incompetence while lack of due attention from the 
political executives also undermines their role. In most of the cases, policy advisors are outsiders to the ministry; 
not to mention their being political appointees like ministers. They also lack the expected required expertise in 
policy advising in what they are supposed to have mastery of the issue.  
Thus, it is not appropriate to consider policy advisors as real advisors but political aides and party comrades 
to their affiliated ministers. On top of this, in most of the cases, the frequent shifting of ministers also is 
accompanied with shifting of the advisors. This is to say that the advisors come and go together with a minister 
and they would not have adequate time to understand the works of a new ministry let alone identifying issues 
that need intervention and designing better way of executing the existing policies. 
The responses from interviews held with key informants and discussions in focus groups back up the 
argument that civil servants are not in a position to influence policy making processes. In this regard, among the 
key informants who were asked if there is the will from government to engage the bureaucrats in policy 
formulation in their respective institutions, a senior civil servant in Ministry of Industry replied: 
What is important to note is that the policy role of civil servants has never been well developed in most 
ministries. At the same time, practically, no attention was devoted to this matter.  Professional policy advice is 
delivered by special structures, placed outside the ministerial hierarchy. The government uses political cabinets 
placed outside the ministerial hierarchy for the delivery of policy advice.  
Similar argument that strengthens the view that civil servants are excluded from policy development 
process comes from a senior expert in ministry of public service and human resource. He explained:  
To start with, there is no a position classified as policy expert. Hence, civil servants do not take policy -
related issues, in terms of evaluation and recommendation, are under their jurisdiction. What is more, the top 
leadership gives no attention to matters of policy evaluation and recommendation. The leadership always does 
indoctrination of existing policies and try to preach that the existing policies are best with no limitation. In fact, 
civil servants are most often criticized for less performance and lack of commitment to implement the policies. 
There is no need to criticize and recommend on policies but improved implementation performance and 
commitment on the side of the civil servants. Thus, there is no room to criticize policies and civil servants prefer 
to keep silent, though they observe many limitations on the policies they are implementing.  
The implication is that politicians are unwilling to empower civil servants in matters related to policy 
making. This is mainly because the political executives feel that policy development should be carried out only 
by political trustees.  This is a generalist approach which implicitly assumes no need for specialization on policy 
matters.  It is argued that the resulting generalist approach has led to amateurism. Civil servants have often 
voiced a concern about their strong dependence on politicians and reported that they feel that politicians are 
insufficiently responsive. Conversely, the top leadership notes that an unresponsive civil service as an obstacle to 
implementing their policy changes.  
What is more, policy analysis and advice had increasingly been contracted out. At the same time, advisory 
ministers from outside the government oversee and provide policy advice. Policy units were introduced in Prime 
Minister Office, with all of their staff recruited from among senior politicians.  
Of course, there is no obvious reason to criticize the involvement of external advisers in policy 
developments, in principle. However, though the use of political advisers and think tanks is common practice in 
most modern states, the development of policy exclusively or even predominantly by such entities is a danger 
that limits too greatly the role of the civil service in the process of policy making. This, in its part, may prevent 
the making of high quality policies in the long term.  
For the time being, the Ethiopian civil service systems appear to have become extreme version of the 
classical Wilsonian paradigm: politicians make policy and civil servants implement policy. This strict separation 
of policy development and implementation leads to the lack of civil service involvement in policy development. 
In view of the complexity of the problems in contemporary society, however, this is hardly a feasible or 
desirable model for a developmental state.  Ethiopian public administration, therefore, should where possible 
avoid the permanent exclusion of the civil service from policy development. 
However, in considering the close relationship between politicians and senior bureaucrats in developmental 
states and, in particular, the influence of bureaucrats, it is important to note that the power of bureaucrats did not 
go unchallenged and nor was the nature of this relationship wholly fixed over time. For example, in the case of 
Botswana, Charlton (1991) cites a number of high level BDP party officials who saw the influence of 
bureaucrats as a big problem in the country. Furthermore, he noted that bureaucrats were often overruled when it 
came to policies that touched politically sensitive issues which could impact the BDP’s electoral success, such as 
providing universal access to education. This highlights another important point about bureaucratic influence in 
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developmental states: it is a result of political leaders willingly conceding power to bureaucrats on the basis of 
their knowledge about policy issues.  
Thus, one can conclude that politicians have become the sole policy developers (makers).  What is obvious 
is that the policy making process has remained the bona fide arena for politicians.  As a result, the policy making 
in Ethiopian public administration is characterized by top-down; monopolized; a unidirectional flow of power 
and influence that discourages bottom-up policymaking approach. Therefore, while there is a greater distinction 
between the roles of bureaucrats and politicians in the civil service, bureaucrats are, in general, not granted the 
autonomy or the influence in the policy-making process that has been highlighted in the case of developmental 
states. 
The main conclusion is that the civil service is not able to perform decisive and prominent role in policy 
design. Within ministries, the managerial arrangements are relatively constrained by other veto players; not to 
mention ministers’ intervention in routine implementation activities through ad hoc committees or task forces on 
a day-to-day basis when they felt it necessary. Generally speaking, politico-administrative relations are still in 
flux and despite the formal separation of the political and administrative spheres, this division does not protect 
against political intervention and patronage. 
The question is, therefore, in what way and under what conditions the civil service can obtain a greater role 
in policy development processes. In this regard, the need to harness the intellectual capacities and professional 
depth of highly qualified policy professionals and ministerial advisors in the delivery of government’s policies 
and programs is imperative. Thus, it is important to identify possible ways in which the involvement of civil 
servants in policy making and providing professional advice on the substance of policy can be increased thereof 
create civil servants better prepared to play such a role.  
 
IV. Findings and Conclusions 
A. Vision Guidance and Vision Sharing  
As far as creating shared vision on the ideals of developmental state, its policies, and strategies is concerned, the 
Ethiopian civil service is found to be far from the expected level. Regarding this issue, the main finding is that 
not only the politicians and the civil servants but also the top leadership have not always worked together to 
pursue a common vision and objectives.  Divergent interests, values and visions are apparent not only between 
political leadership and the civil servants but also among the core leadership itself. The leadership lacks solid 
unity around the values and vision of developmentalism. Therefore, the leadership lacks the very important 
quality of developmental leadership, in this aspect.  
B. Understanding of and Commitment to Mission and Policies 
Officials, at least those in the higher or closer to the higher rank, could be on same page in their understanding 
and perception of what they are dealing with. However, this is not the case; they have been seen using different 
and inconsistent approaches to development policies and strategies. There seems to be a paucity of solidified 
understanding about what developmental state is, how Ethiopia is embracing it, and how the policies be 
implemented. 
• There exist different outlooks and interpretations concerning the relationship between the political 
executives and the civil servants. This shows that there is a breakdown in trust and cooperation between 
the civil servants and political executives. 
C. The Role of Bureaucrats in Policy Making-Processes  
The issue of professional influence in public policy-making is another indicator of politics - bureaucracy 
interface. In East Asian developmental states, the depth of political appointments was low which has been cited 
as one important reason for that regions economic success. The finding that the existence of deep layers of 
political appointments in the Ethiopian bureaucracy would indicate a lesser role of bureaucrats in policy making.  
• Undue pervasive political influence on the public is one of the constraining factors to effective policy 
implementation in Ethiopian public administration. The process of policy formulation and decision making 
has been highly centralized and relatively opaque to the public servants at large. Usually, the political 
leaders formulate policies and as well control and direct the implementation activities of the policy. 
• Unlike many developmental states, politicians believe that they have fiduciary powers and, therefore, the 
prerogative to set policies, and that the administrators should obediently implement them. Such a view 
implicates, in case of policy formulation, that the Ethiopian public administration developed as almost a 
classical Weberian administration, where the civil service is only concerned with policy implementation, 
according to the law.  
• This is contrary to the situation in many developmental states where civil service has gained a virtual 
monopoly on policy development. This demonstrates a clear dichotomy between policy making and policy 
implementation. Therefore, it is found that the exclusion of the civil servants from policy formulation 
process continues and is a feature of the present civil service too. 
D. Lack of Available Expertise  
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• Policy capacities remain a highly underdeveloped quality in Ethiopian public administration. The 
politicization of top level appointments is seen as one of the factors in the weakening of policy related 
engagements, as professional capacity at senior level declined. As a result, policy making remains mainly 
the task of political leadership and affiliate experts outside of the civil service. Thus, no or little role is left 
for civil servants in policy making process. 
E. The Practical Exclusion of Civil Servants from the Policy Development Process 
• The Ethiopian civil service systems appear to have become extreme version of the classical Wilsonian 
paradigm: politicians make policy and civil servants implement policy. This strict separation of policy 
development and implementation leads to the lack of civil service involvement in policy development.   
F. Frequent Reshuffling of Top Leadership 
• In the Ethiopian public administration, ministers and state ministers rarely stay in one ministry for more than 
one election term. Though not to the extent of the ministers and state ministers, directorate directors also 
come and go frequently. Clearly, frequent turnovers damage the overall performance of the civil service, just 
as frequent turnovers of ministers (often termed reshuffles) impair the performance of the civil service. It 
results also in loose institutional memory and continuity. Thus, unless the reasons for such frequent changes 
are gross indiscretion and/or corruption on the part of the heads, it should be carefully managed. 
Therefore, the implementation of developmental policies is undertaken by people of least competence in 
professional terms who work in a tense political environment. To sum up, the civil service is not able to perform 
decisive and prominent role in policy design. Within ministries, the managerial arrangements are relatively 
constrained by other veto players; not to mention ministers’ intervention in routine implementation activities 
through ad hoc committees or task forces on a day-to-day basis when they felt it necessary. Generally speaking, 
politico-administrative relations are still in flux and despite the formal separation of the political and 
administrative spheres, this division does not protect against political intervention and patronage. 
Recommendations 
• Managing the political - administrative interface is a key aspect of the tradeoffs that must be made. The 
objectives of political involvement in senior appointment should be to enhance politically responsive policy 
and implementation, rather than patronage in the form of jobs to party faithful or family members.  
• It should be noted that any short-cut to de-politicization can hardly be successful. Civil-service 
professionalization will be promoted, in the longer term, by the development of the pool of human resources 
and of labor markets.  
So, what are the reform options for the shorter term? It is recommended with the following possibilities:  
a) Hybrid Senior Appointments: Many countries have a significant number of hybrid appointments in which 
merit, defined by meeting explicit and contestable criteria, is accompanied by subjective political judgments. By 
contrast with "pure" political appointments, in hybrid appointments merit is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for appointment.  
However, hybrid appointments require careful management. There are two problems to be solved in hybrid 
appointments: first, attracting the best, given that merit is not a sufficient criterion for appointment and so the 
best might be deterred by the threat of apparently arbitrary political dismissal. The second is balancing two 
conflicting sets of recruitment criteria. 
The most common solution is a "pool system" which places the candidate in a pool upon satisfying the merit 
criteria.  Those, in the pool are then available for subsequent political selection. Here, the advantage is, therefore, 
with the acceptance of some level of politicization, it helps us to introduce meritocracy.  
a) Select among the appointees based on competence: Merit - based selection can be through a system of 
university - style competitive examination (as in South Korea), or by scrutinizing educational qualifications 
(as in Singapore). Such methods are fair and command public confidence, but they define the best person for 
any given job as the one that does well in examinations. 
b) Start Pure merit system in Economic Ministries: There are some ministries which are less political. Such 
ministries mainly need high level experts with less political missions. Thus, it is advisable to implement 
meritocracy by selecting ministries with less political more economic missions. 
However, it should be clear that none of these is as important, as the clearly demonstrated political will to pursue 
the development of a merit-based and professional civil service. 
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Table 1: Civil servants view on mission understanding ad level of commitment 
  Yes No Do Not 
Know 
Total 
Individual employees have a sense of the ministry’s 
mission 
 
Frequency 12 49 2 63 
Percent 19.4 77.6 3 100 
Employees strive to the policies decided upon by top 
political leadership 
Frequency 22 37 4 63 
Percent  34.9 58.8 6.3 100 
 
Table 2: Civil servants believes regarding their role in a policy making process and their engagement 
  A SA NC D SD Total 
Responsibilities of civil servants include policy 
making 
Frequency 29 10 1 18 5 63 
Percent (%) 46 15.9 1.6 28.5 7.9 100 
The ministry or its officials and experts 
engage in policy making processes (like policy 
drafting, reviewing, and commentary) in areas 
under the ministry’s jurisdiction. 
Frequency 11 4 4 33 11 63 
Percent (%) 17.5 6.3 6.3 52.4 17.5 100 
1Henok Seyoum Assefa is a senior researcher in Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Policy Study and 
Research Center. 
 
